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J. RODNEY JOHNSON 
The Absence of Due Process 
in Fiduciary Accounting 
A Constitutional Concem 
Introduction. Once upon a time the content of a legal no-
tice posted on the courthouse door was likely to become a 
matter of community knowledge within a reasonable period of 
time. Today, however, few persons would seriously suggest 
that courthouse posting satisfies minimum due process require-
ments for notice to parties of a proceeding affecting their prop-
erty rights. Yet this is the only form of notice that Virginia law 
provides for beneficiaries when their fiduciaries make account-
ings before the commissioner of accounts. And, topping this, 
there is no provision for any form of notice to beneficiaries 
when the commissioner reports to the court on the fiduciaries' 
accountings. Accordingly, this article argues that Virginia's 
present fiduciary accounting notice provision, Code § 26-27, 
is patently unconstitutional and that it should be replaced in 
an orderly fashion before a judicial decision to that effect casts 
our fiduciary administration system into disarray. Legislative 
proposals are appended to this article that will largely, though 
not perfectly, resolve these problems without imposing a time, 
substance, or economic burden on any party. Although Code 
§ 26-27 deals with the accounts of personal representatives, 
guardians, curators, committees, and trustees, this article will 
focus on only one of these groups - testamentary trustees -
in order to facilitate a presentation of the issues. 
Accountings by a testamentary trustee. Testamentary trust-
ees are required to make annual settlements of their accounts 
before the commissioner of accounts. 1 These accountings typi-
cally contain a chronological recitation of all receipts, expenses 
and distributions during the accounting period, which may be 
broken down into different subcategories in some cases. Dur-
ing the settlement process a beneficiary has the right to appear 
before the commissioner and "insist upon· or object to any-
thing which could be insisted upon or objected to by him ... if 
the commissioner were acting under an order of a court of chan-
cery for the settlement thereof, made in a suit to which he ... was 
a party."2 Unlike the highly formalized, court-oriented proce-
dures in many other jurisdictions, Virginia's approach is in-
tended to provide a more informal, ''user-friendly" procedure 
before the commissioner. Indeed, the Manual for Commission-
ers of Accounts states that"( o )ne strength of the Commissioner 
system is informal resolution without the beneficiary being 
required to hire counsel."3 Following the commissioner's settle-
ment of the trustee's account, the commissioner is required to 
file a report thereon in the circuit court clerk's office, along 
with "any matters specially stated deemed pertinent by the 
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commissioner, or which may be required by any person inter-
ested to be so stated."4 The commissioner's report lies in the 
clerk's office for a period of 15 days during which a beneficiary 
11 
may file exceptions thereto in another simplified procedure. 5 
If no exceptions are filed within this 15-day period, the 
commissioner's report is automatically confirmed.6 Following 
this automatic confirmation the commissioner's report "shall 
be taken to be correct, except so far as it may, in a suit in proper 
time, be surcharged or falsified."7 
Consequences of the settlement process. Judge Lamb sums 
up the net result of this settlement procedure as follows -
"The effect of an account regularly stated, followed by [auto-
matic] confirmation, is protection for the fiduciary from any 
assault except by the difficult suit to surcharge and falsify. 
Such accounts are 'prima taciecorrect.'"8 Harrison joins Lamb 
in this characterization of the suit to surcharge and falsify as 
being a "difficult"procedure,9 and the Virginia Supreme Court 
has "expressly held that the ex parte settlements of the com-
missioner of accounts are presumed to be correct until sur-
charged and falsified, and not only the duty of specifying er-
rors, but also the onus probandi devolves on the party com-
plaining."10 Moreover, the complaining party is unable to ob-
tain a review of the entire account that has been settled ex 
parte because "'the inquiry is limited to particular items al-
leged to have been improperly included or omitted, and in all 
other respects the account is left to stand as it is. "'11 
The problem presented. Although a beneficiary is given 
two opportunities to participate in a "user-friendly" account 
settlement process before being relegated to the "difficult" 
procedure of a suit to surcharge and falsify, there is no provi-
sion in Virginia law requiring anyone to give the beneficiary 
notice of either opportunity. The only provision for notice 
about the pending settlement of the trustee's account is found 
in Code § 26~27, which merely (i) requires the commissioner 
to post on the courthouse door a list of the fiduciaries whose 
accounts are before him for settlement, and (ii) prohibits the 
commissioner from completing an account until 10 days after 
such posting. In this regard, the Manual for Commissioners of 
Accounts recognizes that "(t)his posting procedure is clearly 
an anachronism from the 19th century when the Commissioner 
system was established. In rural 19th-century Virginia, citizens 
regularly visited the courthouse to transact business and may 
have paid some attention to the notices posted."12 Such cannot 
be said today, and thus the Manual concludes that "( f)or the 
system to work, the Commissioners must notify those inter-
ested."13 
However, there is no duty upon the commissioner to give 
any notice other than the courthouse posting required by § 26-
27, and there is no duty upon the trustee of a testamentary trust 
to give beneficiaries any notice at all. 14 Thus a known benefi-
ciary of a testamentary trust, whose whereabouts are also known, 
(i) has no right to receive notice calculated to advise the ben-
eficiary of the pending settlement of the trustee's account in 
the commissioner's office, and (ii) has no right to receive any 
notice of any kind, not even by posting, of the commissioner's 
report being filed with the court and the beginning of the 15-
day period for filing objections before the commissioner's re-
port is automatically confirmed. 
12 
The constitutional context. Although there are later cases, 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 15 is the U.S. 
Supreme Court's landmark decision dealing with due process 
in fiduciary accountings. Mullane arose in the context of a 
bank, serving as trustee of a common trust fund, making a 
judicial settlement of its trust accounts based upon notice to 
beneficiaries by newspaper publication pursuant to New York 
law. In responding to the claim that this newspaper notice was 
constitutionally insufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court noted that 
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and 
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there 
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of ... property by adjudication be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case. 16 
The lack of notice to beneficiaries in Virginia fiduciary ac-
counting effectively deprives them of the opportunity to par-
ticipate in either (i) the "user-friendly" settlement procedure 
before the commissioner, or (ii) the relatively simple remedy of 
filing exceptions to the commissioner's report. The property 
interests of such a beneficiary are negatively impacted in sev-
eral ways as a consequence of this lack of notice. First, the 
beneficiary's property interest in the trust is subjected to some 
diminution by the costs associated with the settlement proce-
dure, in which lack of notice precluded participation.17 Sec-
ond, the beneficiary has lost the opportunity to protect his 
property interests in the expedient and "user-friendly" settle-
ment procedure before the commissioner (as well as the oppor-
tunity to file exceptions to the commissioner's report), and 
must now attempt to protect his property interests in the "diffi-
cult" suit to surcharge and falsify where the commissioner's 
report is prima tacie correct and the beneficiary bears the bur-
den of proof in establishing the contrary.18 Third, the benefi-
ciary must now expend additional funds to retain counsel to 
prosecute the suit to surcharge and falsify in order to have any 
remedy, whereas a remedy without the necessity of counsel or 
expenses of a suit existed in the commissioner's office. And 
fourth, the complainant in a suit to surcharge and falsify is 
unable to obtain a review of the entire account that has been 
settled ex parte because "'the inquiry is limited to particular 
items alleged to have been improperly included or omitted, 
and in all other respects the account is left to stand as it is. "'19 
The foregoing, which is not meant to be exhaustive, should be 
sufficient to establish that a beneficiary does experience a dep-
rivation or diminution of property in these cases. 
After discussing the general unreliability of newspaper pub-
lication to give notice, but recognizing that in some instances 
newspaper publication was the only method realistically avail-
able, the Court in Mullane went on to hold that it did not meet 
minimum due process requirements in that case, and further 
stated that 
(w)here the names and post office addresses of those 
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons dis-
appear for resort to means less likely than the mails to 
apprise them of its pendency. The trustee has on its 
books the names and addresses of the income benefi-
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ciaries represented by appellant, and we find no ten-
able ground for dispensing with a serious effort to 
inform them personally of the accounting, at least by 
ordinary mail to the record addresses.20 
The Mullane case can be factually distinguished from the 
case under consideration in insignificant ways, but the two 
cases are the same in substance. In the context of the present 
case, the applicability of the Mullane logic and reasoning can-
not be denied vis-a-vis the diminution of the beneficiary's prop-
erty interest, the ease with which the trustee and the commis-
sioner may give notice to those whose addresses are known, 
and the consequent right of the beneficiary to receive notice 
by a method no less certain than ordinary mail.21 
Responses to the problem in Virginia. The issue of notice 
in fiduciary accounting has come before three groups in Vir-
ginia during the past decade. The responses made by these 
groups are reported in the following paragraphs. 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Tulsa 
Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 22 which was based 
upon the Mullane rationale, The Virginia Bar Association's 
Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates became concerned about 
the impact of these two cases upon the probate process and 
fiduciary notice in Virginia. This concern led to numerous dis-
cussions by the Section that culminated in a document identi-
fying a number of constitutional deficiencies in Virginia es-
tates and trusts law, two of which are the subject-matter of this 
article - fiduciary accountings to the commissioner of ac-
counts and the commissioner's report to the court.23 
Another group whose members' professional lives cause 
them to be constantly examining issues such as those raised 
herein are the faculty members at Virginia's six law schools 
who teach in the estates and trusts field. In August 1996, the 
following inquiry was sent to a faculty member teaching in the 
field of estates and trusts at each of Virginia's six law schools: 
In regard to the constitutional sufficiency of Virginia 
Code § 26-27's provision for notice to beneficiaries 
in accounting proceedings, I (do) (do not) [please circle 
your choice] believe that this section satisfies the due 
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when applied to known beneficiaries whose where-
abouts are also known. 
All of the addressees responded to this inquiry, and each one 
circled "do not."24 
The Judicial Council of Virginia established a Standing 
Committee on Commissioners of Accounts in January 1993, 
and gave the Committee six charges, one of which was to make 
a continuous review of the statutes relating to fiduciaries. The 
issue of notice in fiduciary accountings came before the Stand-
ing Committee in the fall of 1996, while it was considering the 
legislative proposals it would seek to have introduced in the 
1997 Session. Following a lengthy discussion of the issue, a 
motion was made to determine whether or not the Standing 
Committee was in favor of giving any notice, without regard to 
how that notice might be satisfied. The members present were 
equally divided on this issue and thus the motion failed on a 
tie vote. Putting the constitutional issues aside, this vote is 
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particularly difficult to understand in the light of the Standing 
Committee's statement in its own Manual that "(f)or the sys-
tem to work, the Commissioners must notify those interested. "25 
Conclusion. In regard to the need for remedial legislation to 
resolve the within-described problems, it is submitted that the 
affirmative opinions (i) contained in the Report of The Vir-
ginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 
(ii) of all of the surveyed law professors who teach in the field 
of estates and trusts in Virginia, and (iii) of a significant num-
ber of the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts, 
corroborate the arguments made in this article, and collectively 
all of the foregoing mandate a legislative response. 
As noted at the outset, this article's discussion focuses on 
the rights of a beneficiary of a testamentary trust for purposes 
of convenience. However, it requires little imagination to see 
that the foregoing arguments also apply to accountings of per-
sonal representatives, guardians, curators, committees and, ef-
fective January 1, 1998, conservators for incapacitated per-
sons. Thus the proposed statute that is appended to the article 
deals with all of these fiduciaries. 
In the absence of a legislative resolution of the issues raised 
herein, it is only a question of time before a case raising them 
comes before the courts. One such case did go to the Virginia 
Supreme Court in 1995, but the Court was able to decide it 
without reaching the constitutional questions.26 These issues 
may be reached in the next case, however, with the potential of 
throwing Virginia's fiduciary accounting system into turmoil. 
Therefore, until such time as appropriate legislation issues from 
the General Assembly, the prudent fiduciary (and commis-
sioner?) may wish to consider voluntarily giving the notices 
suggested herein. An interested party cannot claim to have 
been denied procedural due process by § 26-27 if that party 
was given actual knowledge of the proceeding in question. 
A postscript concerning inventories. It is further submitted 
that a parallel provision should be added to the Code requiring 
fiduciaries to give mailed notice to beneficiaries when they 
file inventories of their estates with the commissioner of ac-
counts. Although none of the foregoing constitutional argu-
ments are applicable to inventory filing, many good reasons 
for giving this notice do exist, such as fiduciary disclosure, 
"sunshine," and protection of the common good. The person 
filing the inventory stands in a fiduciary relationship to those 
who own the estate and elementary principles of fiduciary dis-
closure suggest that the owners ought to be advised of the 
content of their estate and the value placed thereon by their 
fiduciary. From a "sunshine" standpoint, there are obvious in-
centives to a fiduciary's full disclosure of all of the assets in an 
estate, and their more accurate valuation, if the fiduciary must 
send a copy of the inventory to parties who are likely to have 
knowledge about this property. From the standpoint of pro-
tecting the common good, those who receive a copy of an 
inventory that is defective in content or valuation are in a 
position to bring the problem to the attention of the commis-
sioner who otherwise would normally approve the defective 
inventory without a realization of its deficiencies. 
13 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
NEW § 26-27.1. Written notice of filing inventories and accountings to be provided to certain parties. - Every 
fiduciary filing an inventory or accounting with the commissioner of accounts shall give notice thereof by first class mail 
(A) in connection with a decedent's estate, to those persons who were entitled to notice from the fiduciary pursuant 
to § 64.1-122.2, except that notice to heirs shall not be required in a testate matter; 
(B) in connection with a testamentary trust, to all beneficiaries who are or, in the exercise of the trustee's discretion, 
may be entitled to any present distribution of income or principal; 
(C) in connection with a minor's estate, to those individuals who would be the minor's heirs ifthe minor were to die 
on the date that notice is given; and 
(D) in connection with an adult incapacitated person's estate, to any known agent under a durable power of attorney 
or, in there is no such agent or if the fiduciary is also such agent, to those individuals who would be the incapacitated 
person's heirs ifthe person were to die on the date that notice is given. 
(E) Notwithstanding the provisions of clauses (B), (C) and (D), notice need not be given to (i) an incapacitated person 
if notice is given to his fiduciary, (ii) any minor for whom no guardian has been appointed, if notice is provided to his 
parent or person standing in loco parentis, (iii) any unborn or unascertained persons, and (iv) any person who has waived 
the right to notice hereunder. 
(F) Forms for the notice required by this section, which shall contain appropriate instructions concerning their use, 
shall be prepared by the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court and shall provide for the attachment of a 
copy of the inventory or accounting (not including any supporting documents) thereto. Such forms shall be furnished to 
each clerk of court, who shall provide copies thereof to every fiduciary who qualifies in the clerk's office. 
(G) No commissioner of accounts shall approve any inventory or accounting 
(1) until twenty-one days have elapsed from the receipt thereof, and 
(2) unless the inventory or accounting contains a statement that the notice required by this section (i) has 
been given, and shows the names and addresses of those to whom it was given, (ii) has been waived, or 
(iii) cannot be given due to the inability of the fiduciary, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, to 
determine the name and address of any person to whom notice is required. 
§ 26-32. Where filed; notice to interested parties. -The commissioner shall file the report in the office of the court by 
which he is appointed, as soon as practicable after its completion. On or before the date of such filing the commissioner 
shall mail or deliver a copy of the report to eveiy person who was given notice of the accounting pursuant to § 26-27.1. 
§ 26-14. Commissioners to inspect and file inventories with clerks; notice to interested parties. - The commissioner 
shall inspect all inventories returned to him by fiduciaries, see that they are in proper form, and, within ten days after they 
are respectively received and approved by him, deliver them to the clerk of the court, to be recorded as required by law. On 
or before the date of such delivery, the commissioner shall mail or deliver a copy of the inventoiy to eveiy person who was 
given notice of its filing pursuant to § 26-27.1. 
§ 26-27. Commissioners to post list of fiduciaries whose accounts are before them for settlement. - Repealed. 
Although a fiduciary's inventory becomes a public record 
after the commissioner approves it and lodges it with the clerk 
of court, and an interested party can obtain a copy upon be-
coming aware of the filing, the question to be answered is 
"What purpose is being accomplished, or public policy served, 
by making the interested parties wait until this time before 
they are entitled to any notice; particularly when the later one 
discovers an error the more difficult it is to rectify that error in 
many cases?" It certainly cannot be said that notice is unneces-
sary because the commissioner is protecting the interests of the 
parties, because the commissioner's approval is "of the form of 
the inventory only."27 
the persons who are entitled to receive notice of inventory and 
accounting are the same persons to whom the personal repre-
sentative has already sent notice of probate - persons whose 
names and addresses are already in the fiduciary's files. The 
only burden placed upon the personal representative will be 
photocopying and mailing a copy of the accounting to these 
same persons. 
The remainder of new§ 26-27.1 deals with the other fidu-
ciaries who are required to account. For purposes of clarity, the 
rule for each kind of fiduciary is set forth in a separate para-
graph. Again, in each of these cases, the identity of the persons 
entitled to notice will normally be known and the only burden 
placed upon the fiduciary will be photocopying and mailing. The proposed legislation. The first of the above three stat-
ues, new § 26-27.1, deals with notice to interested parties of 
the filing of inventories and accountings before the commis-
sioner. 28 Paragraph (A) of new§ 26-27.l focuses on notice by 
personal representatives, and parallels the provisions presently 
found in § 64.1-122.2, that establishes the notice of probate 
that they must give. Simplicity is obtained by providing that 
14 
The remaining proposals are simply amendments to § 26-
32, which requires the commissioner to file account reports 
with the clerk of court, and § 26-14, which requires the com-
missioner to deliver approved inventories to the clerk of court. 
The notice requirement created by the amendments to these 
sections simply requires the commissioner to give mailed no-
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tice to persons whose names and addresses have already been 
provided by the fiduciary. 29 This will not impose any substan-
tive burden upon the commissioner of accounts, but it will 
satisfy the beneficiaries' rights to due process. 
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